Extending devolution: ‘Funding Devo More’ and what it is trying to do

On Friday, IPPR publishedFinancing Devo More cover Funding Devo More, a major paper of mine setting out an approach to enhanced financial devolution (available here).  It is intended first of all to offer a meaningful option for extended devolution in Scotland, where all three unionist parties have said that further devolution will be on offer if there is a vote to stay in the Union in the 2014 referendum.  That is not all it does, though; it is also intended to work for Wales and Northern Ireland as well, if they wish to go down the path of further fiscal devolution.

This paper draws on work on both devolution finance and the working of federal systems that I have been doing for many years now, starting with my time at the Constitution Unit in the early 2000s working on its Leverhulme-funded programme ‘Nations and Regions: the dynamics of devolution’, as well as work on Brazil and Switzerland I carried out at Edinburgh University.  If nothing else, this indicates how academic research often takes a long time to pay off, and can do so in ways that were unexpected at the outset.

An option like this is badly needed, for two reasons.  First, there is clear evidence that it is what the people of Scotland want.  They like devolution and want more of it; in particular, they want devolution to affect control of taxation and welfare.  That has been shown clearly in numerous opinion surveys, particularly the Scottish Social Attitudes ones, and their 2012 findings just released confirm the point.  Outright devolution of those is very difficult within the Union – it would only be possible with some sort of ‘devo max’ approach, which is emphatically not what I am proposing.  Apart from anything else, it would not be viable for Wales or Northern Ireland.  Significant control of those is, however, possible, and that is what this paper (and the wider ‘Devo More’ project of which it forms the first output) is investigating.  Finding practicable ways to ensure devolved control of these functions is part of making sure that Scottish devolution (and devolution elsewhere) matches the aspirations of the Scottish people, a basic democratic goal.  It also serves a more constitutionally fundamental purpose; it ensures that government in Scotland (and elsewhere) is, and should remain, legitimate.  Devolution in 1998 was, after all, a response to similar problems that arose both Wales and Scotland in the 1980s and 1990s.

Second, it relates to the 2014 independence referendum.  An ‘enhanced devolution’ scheme is not on the ballot paper, of course.  That is probably right; it would be hard (though not impossible) for a referendum to offer multiple choices to the voters in such a way that it would also establish a clear mandate for independence, if that were the choice of the electorate.  Once the SNP committed itself to having a single referendum on independence, it effectively ruled out putting an ‘extra devolution’ option to the voters in the same poll, even though it dangled the prospect of that in front of Scottish voters after the 2011 election.  (The situation might be different if the SNP had embraced a two-referendums strategy, as the first poll would be a way of identifying the preferred options not making a conclusive decision.  That was the SNP’s choice; by trying to bring a third option into a ‘decisive’ referendum, they muddied the waters so much it was off the cards.)

There are good practical reasons why more devolution could not have been on offer in any event.  There was no such scheme on the table, and still is not.  You could not prepare for a referendum in which one of the options was essentially undefined until the last minute.  (The Welsh referendum on legislative powers in 2011 shows how badly such polls can go if an expected player doesn’t show up.)  Such a scheme would need to have agreement across the unionist parties to be viable, as the Calman proposals had.  It’s fair to say that before now the unionist parties where in no mood to consider such an option, and many (such as Joyce McMillan, here) question whether they are now.  This is only a proposal for a scheme which is meant to work for all the unionist parties; we shall see whether they embrace it, and how enthusiastically they do so.  But defining such an option plays into the wider referendum debates by enabling the offer of ‘more powers after a referendum’ to be a credible one.  The battle-ground in the referendum campaign is voters who support that; if they do want more devolution but do not believe that promises of it will be delivered after a poll, the risk increases that a referendum will be lost.

Part of what has to define an ‘enhanced devolution’ scheme is what works in the interest of the UK as a whole.  This scheme is meant to do that; it is intended to work for Wales and Northern Ireland as well, if they wish to go down the path of fiscal devolution.  It is also designed to be ‘union-reinforcing’ rather than ‘union-weakening’, as ‘devo max’ would be, and as devolution of taxes like corporation tax, inheritance tax or fuel duties would be likely to be.

It also offers benefits for England, chiefly because the transfer of fiscal capacity to Scotland and other devolved governments will both enable and require them to finance spending on better services than those in England out of their own resources.  Free university tuition in Scotland has become a politically toxic symbol of supposedly generous financing of Scotland.  Some of this anger is misplaced, and is to do with choices made by devolved governments – funding, say, free prescriptions at the cost of other functions.  But some of it has a point.  Transferring a significant degree of fiscal capacity means that, if the Scottish Government wishes to provide an overall higher level of public services, it can do so – but Scottish taxpayers will have to pay for it, and the Scottish Government will have to make the case to its voters for that.  That is what autonomy means.

Fiscal devolution does not stop the UK Government undertaking redistribution across the UK, if it wishes.  A ‘vertical fiscal imbalance’ – a gap between the revenues a regional-level government can raise using its own tax powers, and its spending obligations – is common in federal systems.  In the UK it is unavoidable.  There are many taxes which are not suitable for devolution, either because the administrative costs of doing so would be disproportionate, or because of the character of the taxes themselves.  Take fuel duties as an example.  These are a useful source of revenue (they account for about 5 per cent of total UK tax revenues, proportionally more in Wales and Northern Ireland).  However, devolving something so obviously and necessarily mobile would trigger widespread avoidance, tax competition or both, and even then would incur considerable compliance costs, even though the burden of them falls heavily on people who live or work in sparsely-populated areas like the Scottish Highlands or mid-Wales.  The same applies to a good many other taxes, which are best left in UK Government hands.  Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland taxpayers will continue to contribute to the UK as a whole, through a wide range of non-devolved taxes, and it is for the UK Government to decide how to use those.

The recipe I have come up with involves handing over four sets of revenues to devolved governments:

  • All personal income tax, including decisions about rates, thresholds, exemptions and relief.  There will need to be some practical restrictions on this, if HM Revenue & Customs are to continue to collect income tax across the UK (and there are good reasons why they should), but those should be as minimal as possible for administrative reasons.
  • All land taxes.  This should be uncontroversial; to a large degree, it has already been accomplished for Scotland through the Scotland Act 2012, and is recommended for Wales by the Silk Commission (and supported by the Welsh Government).  Land taxes are not a major source of revenue, but they are a secure and easily devolvable tax base, and are an important instrument of policy as well.
  • ‘Sin taxes’, meaning duties on alcohol and tobacco.  This faces serious legal problems, but there is such a close relationship between the harm these products can do and other devolved functions, notably public health, that devolved governments should have control over tax levers as well as regulatory mechanisms when dealing with them.  They are also quite useful as sources of revenue.
  • Assign a large proportion – 10 points, of the 20 currently levied – of Value Added Tax.  EU law prevents devolution of VAT, although sales taxes are commonly levied by state or regional-level governments in federal systems.  Assigning it – passing the revenues directly to a devolved government, which does not have control of the rate of tax or what the tax is levied on – was considered and dismissed by the Calman Commission for Scotland, and the Holtham and Silk Commissions for Wales.  But, if we are looking at going meaningfully beyond that model of fiscal devolution, we have to think again.  VAT is a major source of revenue, and in the hunt for ‘devolvable’ taxes the choice of good taxes to devolve is a very limited one.  A major consumption tax is an attractive proposition for regional-level governments, and assigning it is the best one can do.

This is not so much the end of my work on devolution finance as establishing a clear starting point.  It is impossible to work out a scheme for devolution finance without working out what it is you are financing.  I have used the current division of functions between the devolved governments and London for this work, and if there were further devolution of expensive functions (notably welfare benefits, but also policing and criminal justice in Wales) it would be necessary to look at this again.  In later work in IPPR’s ‘Devo More’ project, we shall be considering those issues; that will mean returning to financial issues afterward as well.  But using 2010-11 figures, this model would have put £21.7 billion directly into the hands of the Scottish Government, £9.7 billion into those of the Welsh Government, and £6.1 billion into those of the Northern Ireland Executive.  That equates to 60.6 per cent of Scottish devolved spending, 62.2 per cent of Welsh devolved spending and 55.6 per cent of devolved non-social security spending in Northern Ireland.  Of that, large proportions would come from wholly devolved taxes: 42.1 per cent of Scottish spending, 44.2 of that in Wales, and 34.3 per cent of that in Northern Ireland.  That contrasts with the measures in the Scotland Act 2012, which would devolve taxes revenues accounting for around 30 per cent of devolved spending in Scotland, and the Silk Commission’s proposals, which would account for about 25 per cent in Wales.

Whatever form fiscal devolution takes, it is important to think about it as a package. Devolving one or two taxes on their own increases the risk of government revenues being exposed to serious shocks.  That is especially the case with volatile taxes like corporation tax.  Some devolved services are simply inflationary in character (notably health). Others are counter-cyclical, with demand increasing somewhat when times are bad (notably education).  None of them get cheaper to provide in hard times.  As there’s no such thing as a counter-cyclical major tax, stable revenues are needed to pay for them, and if the UK Government is to cease to manage the risk of fluctuations in revenue (which it does at present, through the block grant and formula system), devolved governments need tax revenues that are relatively stable, and if possible that balance the fluctuations among them.  The combination of devolved income tax and assigned VAT, in particular, does that.  Assigning VAT might not give devolved governments any control over policy levers, but the revenues are relatively stable, act as a counterweight to income tax ones (they shrink and grow on a different cycle), and over time it is a growth tax.

This model is an attempt to make a devolved UK work better; to enable it to be both more devolved, but also more unified.  Quite a lot of work remains to be done, but it hard to see that any sort of durable and workable solution would not draw heavily on it.

The report Funding Devo More: Fiscal options for strengthening the Union was published on Friday 25 January, and is available from IPPR’s website HERE

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12 Comments

Filed under Devolution finance, Northern Ireland, Publications and projects, Scotland, Wales

12 responses to “Extending devolution: ‘Funding Devo More’ and what it is trying to do

  1. Once the SNP committed itself to having a single referendum on independence, it effectively ruled out putting an ‘extra devolution’ option to the voters in the same poll

    No the unionists did not want it on the ballot paper as it was outwith the SNP’s mandate to deliver, no wonder we get annoyed when the actual facts are deliberately muddied.

  2. Old Albion

    Just a couple of simple questions.
    How much Devo can Scotland be given (along with Wales and N.Ireland) before it becomes independence in all but name?
    Why are the English expected to sit back and watch all this going on. Without ever being offered a single morsel of devolution or democracy or indeed our own parliament?
    (and splitting us up into nine Euro-regions is not the English idea of devolution)

  3. Peter A Bell

    What is the point of all this? There is no devo-whatever option on the referendum ballot. The unionists insisted on excluding such an option. They cannot plausibly now pretend that a NO vote is a vote for something other than the status quo – with the very real threat that it will be used as an excuse to roll back devolution.

    If, as polls seem to suggest, the people of Scotland want more powers for their parliament then the ONLY way to achieve this is by voting YES in the referendum.

  4. Pingback: Extending devolution: ‘Funding Devo More’ and what it is trying to do | Referendum 2014 | Scoop.it

  5. Jean du Pays

    A very good, solid contribution to a much-needed clear-headed debate.

    One thing that’s still not clear, though, is whether you can have further expenditure and revenue devolution without also providing for greater flexibility and autonomy in relation to public sector borrowing. After all, with increased own-source revenues and expenditure responsibilities — and with no assurances that the two will grow and change in lock-step over time, there can’t help but be a need to think through how the fluctuating gap between the two will be financed. Hopefully, this is one of the future pieces of work that will emerge from the IPPR’s “DevoMore” project later on.

  6. Mike Blundell

    The transfer of authority by the British Government to institutions in Scotland and Wales has removed the legitimacy of the British Government to rule England.

    You are right to promote increasing the legitimacy of the Scottish and Welsh Governments by promoting the transfer of funding authority but you need to embrace the mid-lothian question. For how long will Scottish and Welsh representatives sit in the House of Commons and House of Lords deciding on matters relating to England. Are you proposing that Scottish and Welsh MPs decide on matters relating to taxation that affect England only?

  7. orpheuslyre

    Alan, you mention that English anger will be salved by this process because some English anger is indeed justified (and some is not). I’m not 100% sure what that means. Are you perhaps referring to the present state of the Barnett formula?

  8. orpheuslyre

    OK, to answer my own question now I’ve read the full report, it does appear to originate in your discussion of Barnett, though for some reason it looms larger in your summary than the actual report.
    The report itself is interesting. Its quite descriptive and didactic in its way, and easy to read for the non-specialist which I guess was part of your intention.

  9. Pingback: My involvement in the IPPR’s Devo More project « Devolution Matters

  10. Nothing on how reduced-rate VAT would be treated? What proportion of VAT is raised from reduced-rate transactions anyway?

    Ignoring extra-regio items for the moment, as your proposals do, would “land tax” include on-shore resource extraction taxes? Aggregates levies are already included, so I presume this is possible.

    Regarding Treasury oversight of new taxes, it seems to me that we have enough experience (e.g. LIT and Council Tax rebates in the last Scottish parliament, VAT in relation to the new police force) to know, rather than simply suspect, that this is a problem area. But the Treasury is the elephant in the room in all fiscal devolution proposals.

  11. Chris

    If Scotland votes no to independence, further devolution will not be a solution in itself. I think we would need to repeal the acts of union of 1707 and 1801 and create a new, federal act of union recognising the four nations in the UK, in effect a UK constitution. This would define the responsibilities of the federal (UK) government (immigration, defence, foreign affairs & international treaties) and stating the taxes it can take (customs duties and VAT). This will solve the west-Lothian question and would allow a clear out of the random nature of the present unwritten constitution but would not stop co-operation between the four nations in areas deemed sensible (e.g. broadcasting). Each country and the UK federal government would be responsible for it own debt.

  12. Pingback: The Strathclyde Commission report | DEVOLUTION MATTERS

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