My analysis of the Calman Commission’s final report, and the broader Scottish constitutional debate, has now appeared in the October issue of the journal Public Law. In it I survey the disjointed constitutional debates in Scotland – the failure of the Calman Commission and the National Conversation to intersect – and the prospects for them to start to do so in consequence of discussions about a referendum on independence. I also argue that the Calman Commission’s proposals about a measure of fiscal autonomy (and indeed the report more generally) are rather conservative, constitutionally speaking. They are concerned with making the model of devolution enacted in 1998 work better, and aren’t accompanied by an attempt to re-assess whether that corresponds with what the people of Scotland now want.
Public Law is an academic journal, and should be available electronically to those with university affiliations (or if you’re willing to pay Sweet & Maxwell for access). It should also be in better reference libraries. The reference is A. Trench, ‘The Calman Commission and Scotland’s Disjointed Constitutional Debates’, Public Law October 2009, 686-96.
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