In just over a week’s time, Scottish voters will choose whether Scotland should become an independent country outside the United Kingdom, or remain a devolved part of the UK. It’s a big decision, but they should not think that the referendum vote is the end of the matter. In reality, it is only the beginning. The pro-union parties have long made it clear that a No vote will start the process of delivering a form of enhanced devolution; a Yes vote will trigger a process leading to independence, about which there are few other certainties.
Much of the campaign in the last few weeks has been about creating a different sort of politics, and a different approach to social policy, within Scotland. But at least as important for Scotland as an independent state is the nature of its relations with the remaining part of the United Kingdom (rUK) – its much larger southerly neighbour, its main economic and trading partner, with which the Scottish Government aspires to share a currency, ‘social union’ and much more. All those plans are predicated on a close and amicable relationship with rUK, with Scotland able to enjoy the continuing benefit of a number of services that the UK presently offers to all its citizens. The question is: can that vision actually be delivered? Even if that model t is the interests of an independent Scotland, why is it in the interests of rUK, if Scotland chooses a future outside it? If it is not, why should rUK comply with independent Scottish wishes – why is it in rUK’s interests to do so? And, given the differences in interest in securing that outcome, how might an independent Scotland make it happen?
If there is a Yes vote, there will be a complex and messy set of negotiations between referendum day and independence day. Before those negotiations can start, and certainly before the Scottish Government can talk to any entity outside the United Kingdom, a paving bill permitting it to do so would need to be passed by Westminster. At the end, following those negotiations, both UK and Scottish Parliaments will need to approve the resulting deal. Not all the issues that need to be resolved between rUK and an independent Scotland (iScotland) will be resolved by independence day. Indeed, if the Czech-Slovak parallels are anything to go by (and that was a much simpler case), they will not be fully resolved for at least two decades. That does not mean Scotland cannot become ‘independent’, but that independence will indeed be a process not an event, with many issues falling to be resolved only months or years later. However, for an independent Scotland to start functioning as an independent state, some key top-order issues have to be resolved. Prominent among these are:
- the currency the new state will use, and who bears the risks associated with that
- the borders of the new state – particularly its maritime borders, which will affect oil and gas reserves unless a distinct arrangement is made for these.
- the arrangements for movement of persons between rUK and the new state, both at the border and more generally
- whether, when and on what terms the new state will be or become a member of the European Union
- the division of the UK’s current National Debt
- the division of other UK assets and liabilities – ranging from defence infrastructure to museum and gallery collections
- what happens to the existing UK nuclear bases on the Clyde
- if rUK is to continue to administer welfare and pensions payments in Scotland for some transitional period, the basis on which it will do so
- the means by which outstanding issues are resolved, and what happens if the parties cannot reach agreement by negotiation.
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